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National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius: Five Takes
by GLENN H. REYNOLDS* AND BRANNON P. DENNING**
Introduction
In its recent decision in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius,' the Supreme Court found that the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act-popularly known as
"Obamacare"-was an unconstitutional assertion of Congress' power
to regulate commerce among the several states, but was nonetheless
sustainable under Congress' power to tax. The Court also placed new
limits on Congress' spending power.
The decision-one of the most eagerly awaited of the twenty-first
century-aroused much speculation. Most of this speculation turned
out to be wrong-and resulted in considerable commentary. In this
article, following our now-famous "Five Takes" format,' we will look
at some possible meanings and implications of the Supreme Court's
decision.
We first consider the resemblance of Sebelius to a pair of famous
cases whose opinions are held out as deftly straddling the line
between principle and prudence: Marbury v. Madison' and Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke" (Takes One and Two). Takes
Three and Four examine the opinion though the lens of constitutional
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1. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012).
2. Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Five Takes on McDonald v. Chicago,
26 J.L. & POL. 273 (2011); Brannon P. Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Five Takes on
District of Columbia v. Heller, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (2008); Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon
P. Denning, What Hath Raich Wrought? Five Takes, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 915
(2005).
3. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
4. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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theory. We consider whether the decision-Chief Justice John
Roberts's opinion especially-served what Charles Black called the
Court's "legitimating" function: quelling doubts about the Act's
constitutionality and, thus, its legitimacy. We further consider
whether, in ultimately upholding the Act despite its relative
unpopularity, Chief Justice Roberts's opinion could be seen as an
example of judicial restraint a la James Bradley Thayer. Finally, in
Take Five, we consider whether the opinion's peculiar construction
handed the Administration a somewhat Pyrrhic victory while laying
the foundation for robust judicially enforced limits on congressional
power. A brief conclusion follows.
I. Take One: It's Marbury Time
Chief Justice Roberts' opinion for the majority struck an odd
note. On the question virtually everyone expected to be
determinative-the constitutionality of the Act under the Commerce
Clause-Roberts ruled as the oral argument prefigured: that the
mandate to purchase health insurance fell outside of Congress'
commerce power. Indeed, he discussed this question at some length,
and with considerable emphasis, before ultimately upholding the Act
as an exercise of Congress' power to tax. However, the Court did not
find the healthcare law enough of a tax to trigger the Anti-Injunction
Act, which would have precluded judicial review on the tax question.
This somewhat unconventional approach came after a months-long
campaign by supporters of the Act, both within and outside the
Obama Administration, to persuade (some might say "bully") the
Court into upholding the Act.
The opinion's half-a-loaf quality has led some commentators to
suggest that Roberts' holding in Sebelius was, like Chief Justice John
Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison, a sort of Trojan horse, in
that it smuggled in a victory over an important legal principle while
shrouding that victory behind a win on the general issue for the
opposing side. The problem is the conception of Marbury and
Sebelius that this suggestion embodies.
Though the conventional wisdom is that Chief Justice Marshall
won a stealth victory in Marbury by finding a power of judicial review
even while exercising that power so as to hand Jefferson a win on the
question before the Court, this conventional wisdom is more
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"conventional" than it is "wisdom."' Today, the Marshall Court's
victory appears greater than it did at the time, thanks to the
foreshortening effect of history.
In truth, Jefferson won the day, and the primacy of the Executive
power over the Judiciary was established; Marbury never did get his
commission. The Supreme Court's power to overturn federal
legislation that in its judgment contradicted the Constitution was not
employed again until fifty-four years later in the ill-fated Dred Scott
decision of 1857,6 by which time both Marshall and Jefferson were in
the grave.! Its next employment came in the 1870 Hepburn v.
Griswold legal tender case.8 The former application was overturned
by the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the latter by the
Court itself. In addition, the Court's 1895 finding that the income tax
violated the Constitution in Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co.
was overturned by the Sixteenth Amendment.9
The Supreme Court did not begin overturning federal statutes
routinely until well into the twentieth century, and even then the
process was dubious during the New Deal. If Marbury was a stealth
victory for the Court, it was an extremely delayed stealth victory. In
Marbury, Marshall did what he could, but he held a weak hand. If he
was tricky-and he was'o-it was because he had no choice. And if
the consequences of his trickiness were limited to the distant future,
that was probably the best that could be done.
Meanwhile, in Sebelius, Chief Justice Roberts held a much
stronger hand. Although President Obama, various allied
officeholders, and pundits spent several months prior to the decision
criticizing the prospect of an Obamacare overturn-to the point that
a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit asked
pointed questions of the Justice Department regarding the
Administration's belief in judicial review"-there was no real
5. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Marbury's Mixed Messages, 71 TENN. L. REv. 303
(2004).
6. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
7. The Court did overturn state laws on constitutional grounds, but the overturning
of state statutes does not raise the separation of powers concerns associated with the
overturning of federal law on constitutional grounds.
8. 75 U.S. 603 (1870).
9. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
10. See generally William Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969
DUKE L.J. 1, 31-32 (describing Justice Marshall's trickiness in considerable detail).
11. Jan Crawford, Appeals Court Fires Back at Obama's Comments on Health Care
Case, CBS NEWS, (Apr. 4, 2012, 12:36 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504564_162-
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prospect that an opinion overturning the healthcare law would be
disobeyed. Since Jefferson's time, the growing prestige of the
Supreme Court (along with, quite likely, the comparatively
diminished prestige of the Presidency) has made the consequence of a
showdown between the Executive and the Judiciary very different.
Richard Nixon, after all, meekly resigned rather than resist an order
to turn over incriminating White House tapes," and George W. Bush
submitted to Supreme Court decisions that he believed
unconstitutionally infringed on the President's power to wage war."
It is unlikely that President Obama would have acted differently, or
that he would have succeeded had he tried.
Unlike Marshall, then, Roberts could have expected a ruling
overturning the healthcare law to have been obeyed. And, given the
unpopularity of the law according to public opinion polls,14 the Court
was unlikely to have faced anything serious in the way of de-
legitimization.
So although the Marbury analogy has a certain appeal-the idea
that upholding the Affordable Care Act was the spoonful of sugar
that made the opinion's language restricting the extent of Congress'
commerce and spending powers go down more easily-it doesn't
really hold. If the commerce and spending language is to have an
impact, it will be in the next few years, not decades hence, and the
57408827-504564/appeals-court-fires-back-at-obamas-comments-on-health-care-case/. ("In
the escalating battle between the administration and the judiciary, a federal appeals court
apparently is calling the president's bluff-ordering the Justice Department to answer by
Thursday whether the Obama Administration believes that the courts have the right to
strike down a federal law, according to a lawyer who was in the courtroom."). See also
Ruth Marcus, The President's Unsettling Attack on the Supreme Court, WASH. POST, (Apr.
2, 2012, 5:45 PM) http://www.washingtonpost.comlblogs/post-partisan/post/obamas-
unsettling-attack-on-the-supreme-court/2012/04/02/gIQA4BXYrS_blog.html ("I would
lament a ruling striking down the individual mandate, but I would not denounce it as
conservative justices run amok. Listening to the arguments and reading the transcript, the
justices struck me as a group wrestling with a legitimate, even difficult, constitutional
question. For the president to imply that the only explanation for a constitutional
conclusion contrary to his own would be out-of-control conservative justices does the
court a disservice.").
12.' United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
13. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
14. See, e.g., CNN Political Unit, Poll: More Americans Pleased If Court Deems
ObamaCare Unconstitutional, CNN.coM, (June 26, 2012 2:51 PM), http://politicalticker.
blogs.cnn.com/2012/06/26/poll-more-americans-pleased-if-court-deems-obamacare-
unconstitutionall ("Thirty-seven percent of Americans say they would be pleased if
President Barack Obama's sweeping health care law is deemed unconstitutional by the
U.S. Supreme Court, nearly ten points higher than the number who say they'd be pleased
if the law is ruled constitutional.").
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Court's treatment of those issues could have had just as much of an
impact (or, more likely, more of an impact) if the Court had
overturned the Act entirely-something that was certainly within its
power. Whereas Marshall lacked the ability to give Marbury his
commission, Roberts was free to strike down the Affordable Care
Act, but chose not to do so. It is possible that Roberts was being as
tricky in his opinion as Marshall was in Marbury, but whatever was
going on in Sebelius, it wasn't very Marbury-like."
Indeed, to the extent that Roberts' decision was determined by
politics-perhaps, as some have speculated, a desire to position the
Court for more "conservative" decisions such as striking down
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, or setting a precedent permitting
the Court to uphold the Defense of Marriage Act on grounds of
judicial minimalism-such motivation would be far removed from the
institutional preservation that animated Marshall's decision in
Marbury. Such motivations, if extant, would seem more along the
lines of judicial politicking than judicial statesmanship.
II. Take Two: Sebelius as Bakke
On the morning of June 28, Court-watchers anxiously awaited an
opinion in a hotly contested, deeply divisive case. The unprecedented
nature of the question presented by the case had subjected the Court
to intense pressure from the contending sides. "[N]o case in modern
memory," said one Justice from the bench when the opinion was
read, had "received as much media and scholarly commentary.""
During the run-up to oral arguments before the Supreme Court, "two
positions clearly emerged. Both were intellectually coherent, legally
tenable, morally defensible. They were also diametrically opposed.""
As one commentator noted, "The choice was stark, and the stakes
enormous. Ultimately, the decision lay with the ... Supreme
Court."" It was assumed the outcome would be dictated by the
position of one Justice, usually regarded as a swing vote.
15. For one sort of possible trickery, if that is the word, see Einer Elhauge, Roberts'
Real Long Game?, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY (July 20, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.
com/politics/archive/2012/07/roberts-real-long-game/260080/ ("The unseen long game is
that sustaining Obamacare as a tax helps preserve the Republicans' ability to adopt two
items on their own political wish list: the Paul Ryan plan to privatize Medicare and George
W. Bush's plan to privatize Social Security.").
16. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL: A BIOGRAPHY 494 (2001).
17. Id. at 463.
18. Id. at 468.
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When the decision was announced, many were puzzled by the
odd 4-1-4 decision; the judgment announced by a Justice whose
opinion on what was considered the issue did not garner a majority.
The lone Justice's opinion satisfied almost no one, and criticism of it
began almost immediately-even before observers had waded
through its more than 150 pages. It seemed to raise more questions
than it answered and left many of the hardest questions for the future.
One commentator dismissed the lone opinion as the product of a
"failure of principle or nerve or vision" and concluded that it was
"unfortunate that the Court allowed his ambivalent, obfuscatory, and
inconclusive opinion to stand as the common denominator on such an
important issue.
The case described above, of course, was Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke;" the "controlling minority of one""
was the "pragmatic conservative,"22 Justice Lewis Powell.
From the beginning, Powell's biographer John Jeffries tells us,
Powell was looking for a dodge. "Powell," he writes, "wanted to
allow some affirmative action, but also to constrain it, to keep it in
check so that race-consciousness would not become the norm."23
Preserving the idea of constitutionally mandated color-blindness was
of central importance to Justice Powell.24 At the same time, he was
reluctant to close the door completely to any consideration of race in
admissions decisions. As Jeffries phrased it, Powell "wanted to say
'yes' now, while implying 'no' later."25 The resulting opinion was "as
conflicted as its author."26 The opinion employed the rhetoric of strict
scrutiny, identified as "compelling" the desire to achieve a
"diverse"-including a racially diverse-class of students, but
condemned the University of California, Davis plan as a
constitutionally proscribed "quota" because it reserved sixteen spaces
for minority applicants.27 Powell's key point-that race could be a
19. Paul Brest, Race Discrimination, in THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-
REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 113,128 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
20. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
21. JEFFRIES, supra note 16, at 490.
22. Id. at 470.
23. Id. at 469.
24. Id.
25. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Bakke Revisited, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 7 (2004).
26. Id. at 1.
27. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978).
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factor, but not the factor-was characterized as "pure sophistry."'
Jeffries added that the opinion, "[c]onsidered purely as a matter of
craft-of consistency with precedent, coherency as doctrine, and
clarity of result ... must be judged a failure."29 Contemporary critics
certainly agreed.'
Writing about Bakke in 2003, after the Grutter and Gratz
decisions," however, Jeffries concluded that-for all its technical
deficiencies-"Lewis Powell saved affirmative action" with Bakke.2
In the same article, he wrote, "I have come-slowly-to the view that
Powell in Bakke was exactly right."" The "Nation would have
suffered for" a clearer answer that attempted to settle all the
outstanding questions. Powell, in Jeffries's opinion, sacrificed
"cogency for wisdom," "spoke for the institution" and "bought
time . . . ."" The opinion was "an appeal to the future" on Powell's
part. Without Powell's "willingness to embrace [the contradiction
between strict scrutiny and genuine diversity]-and to live with the
criticism it provoked-Powell's compromise would have failed."36 He
concluded:
Sometimes, the gap between the conventional criteria
of judging-what Bickel called "reason in the judicial
process," "analytical coherence," and "principled
judgment"-and a politically far-sighted decision is
unbridgeably large. Where that is true, there is no
easy melding of legal craft and political insight. The
judge must choose between them."
Perhaps instead of being a Marbury-esque attempt to criticize the
Administration's signature legislative victory while protecting the
28. JEFFRIES, supra note 16, at 484.
29. Jeffries, supra note 25, at 2.
30. For a sampling of criticism following the decision, see id. at 9-10; see also
JEFFRIES, supra note 16, at 496-97; see also Brest, supra note 19 and accompanying text
(criticisms of Paul Brest).
31. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
32. Jeffries, supra note 25, at 1.
33. Id. at 18.
34. Id. at 21.
35. Id. at 21-22.
36. Id. at 23.
37. Id. at 25.
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Court from political retaliation," Sebelius is Roberts' "appeal to the
future." In twenty-five years, perhaps the technical shortcomings of
the opinion will pale against the statesmanlike, "pragmatic" thrust of
the opinion. It's tempting to make the comparison-especially given
the number of superficial similarities between the two opinions.'
Tempting, but it's unlikely that the Roberts opinion will be regarded
in quite the same way as Powell's.
First, there are differences in the underlying issues. The
uninsured that the Affordable Care Act benefitted hardly occupy the
same moral status as, say, African Americans only a generation
removed from Jim Crow when Bakke was decided. A decision
holding affirmative action unconstitutional for all time would have
been regarded as a significant setback for civil rights-as it was,
Powell's opinion was excoriated as "racist" for its holding that quotas
were impermissible.40 Had Roberts sided with the dissenters and
invalidated the Act in its entirety, health care reform would have
continued-piecemeal and incremental perhaps-but the invalidation
of the mandate would have left open myriad other possibilities for
expanding insurance coverage. Moreover, for those to whom fidelity
to original intent matters, a stronger case can be made that a decision
barring affirmative action in toto ran counter to the intent of the
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, than one claiming the
Framers would have disapproved the regulation of inactivity under
the Commerce Clause.41
Second, while Powell could credibly claim to have sacrificed
consistency in order to preserve a constitutional principle to which he
was deeply committed (that of a color-blind Constitution), Roberts'
opinion left himself open to the charge that he sacrificed both
consistency (by holding that the mandate is both tax and not tax) and
the principle of limited government (by upholding the tax/not-tax
mandate). Whatever proponents of limited government-and of
judicial enforcement of that principle-might have gained in Sebelius
38. See supra notes 5-15 and accompanying text (suggesting why that analogy is
imperfect).
39. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
40. JEFFRIES, supra note 16, at 496 (discussing the reaction by the civil rights
community).
41. Compare Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427 (1997), and Eric
Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment,
71 VA. L. REV. 753 (1985), with Dan T. Coenen, Originalism and the Individual Mandate:
Rounding Out the Government's Case for Constitutionality, 107 Nw. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 55 (2012).
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was substantially eroded by Roberts' capacious reading of Congress'
taxing power. Now, the argument runs, nearly any aspect of
contemporary life can be controlled by the government, if it simply
taxes the decision not to comply with a government diktat. (There is,
of course, another more charitable reading of his opinion, which we
consider infra.42
Finally, one might dispute the premise that Bakke was wisdom
incarnate and that such acts of prudence and far-sightedness ought to
be emulated. Another take is that Powell's Bakke decision was
embraced by affirmative action proponents who realized it was
probably the best they could hope for from the Court in 2003 when
affirmative action looked particularly shaky (especially after
Hopwood v. Texas).43 The Court, by adopting Powell's opinion, was
able to emulate his manipulation of strict scrutiny" and produce a
split decision that further encouraged the less-than-candid use of race
in admissions decisions." The Court's decision to revisit racial
preferences in university admissions in Fisher v. University of Texas at
Austin, moreover, suggests that the canonical status of Powell's
opinion (and its subsequent adoption by the Grutter/Gratz Court) is
not assured.
The benefit of making an "appeal to history" is that one is either
subsequently vindicated or not around to suffer repudiation. It
remains to be seen whether Roberts is remembered as a judicial
statesman or as the author of a too-clever-by-half opinion that put the
Court's imprimatur on a dramatic expansion of governmental power.
What makes us skeptical that his opinion will be praised in the future
is the fact that much of the legal academic community embraced
Bakke largely out of necessity; it was the best hope for preserving
affirmative action in some form. Insofar as Roberts' opinion attempts
to preserve the principle of judicially enforced limits on congressional
power, it is unlikely to be as warmly embraced by the academy.
42. See infra notes 111-127 ("Take Five: The Umpire Strikes Back").
43. Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000) (invalidating Texas' use of racial
preferences in law school admissions).
44. See Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA.
J. CONST. L. 945, 970-80 (2004) (criticizing the Court's application of strict scrutiny in
Grutter).
45. But see Neal Devins, Explaining Grutter v. Bollinger, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 347
(2003) (arguing that the outcome in Grutter reflected elite preferences on affirmative
action).
46. Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132
S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Feb. 21, 2012) (No. 11-345).
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III. Take Three: Sebelius and the Power of Legitimation
Charles Black's 1960 defense of judicial review, The People and
the Court,' has been largely forgotten,'8 probably because it was
overshadowed by his colleague Alexander Bickel's more nuanced The
Least Dangerous Branch,4 9 published two years later. The neglect is
unfair; in fact, The People and the Court influenced Bickel's own
work. Bickel was particularly taken with Black's description and
defense of the Supreme Court's "legitimation" function.o In addition
to checking official action through judicial review, the Court also
legitimated laws and acts alleged to be unconstitutional by upholding
them. In this Take, we reintroduce Black's idea and suggest that
Sebelius was perhaps a not-altogether-successful attempt to legitimate
the Affordable Care Act, about which there was considerable
constitutional doubt.
Black argued that by creating a government of limited powers,
the Framers of the Constitution ensured that the legitimacy of
governmental actions alleged to lie outside the boundaries of those
powers would be called into question from time to time." The new
government needed a forum in which to resolve those disputes that-
again, for legitimacy's sake-would need to be seen as credible."
Unfortunately the judge of that dispute would necessarily be a part of
the very government the legitimacy of whose actions was being
challenged."
47. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960).
48. A search of "charles /2 black /2 'the people and the court"' yields 29 citations on
Westlaw, while a search of "alexander /2 bickel and 'the least dangerous branch"' yields
2410 citations.
49. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
50. Id. at 69 (discussing the legitimating function of the Court).
51. BLACK, supra note 47, at 39 (writing that "for a government based on the theory
of limited powers the problem of the legitimation of governmental action is one of special
difficulty"); id. at 40 (observing that "limitation generates doubt and debate on the
legitimacy of particular actions" and that "[w]here... limitations are built into
government and into the theory validating government, it is certain that particular
interests will from time to time discern in the limitations a forbidding of some action to
which they are about to be subjected").
52. Id. at 38 (noting that "one indispensable ingredient in the original and
continuing legitimation of a government must be its possession and use of some means for
bringing about a consensus on the legitimacy of important governmental measures").
53. Id. at 41 ("the resolution of doubts as to the legitimacy of governmental action
must be undertaken, and bindingly effected, by the government itself").
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The stakes, Black argued, were very high. If the forum for
settling disputes is not seen as credible and its decisions legitimate,
one might set off a "vicious circle" where losers in the process decry
the decision (and the underlying action) as illegitimate, which will
encourage others to make the same claims, and so on.' The ultimate
risk is the government's "loss of moral authority" to govern." Thus,
"[t]he task of persuading the greater part of our people that the
principles of governmental limitation have been adhered to,
notwithstanding differences of private opinion, is and always has been
one of great urgency."" Even short of a total loss of moral authority,
Black maintained that a healthy republic cannot have too many of its
citizens "obey and resent" like sullen teenagers nor should the state
simply rely on coercion to effect its ukases." The problem is
compounded by the fact that contending arguments about broad
powers and limits that will be made in good faith-and that the
harder questions about constitutional meaning-will have no obvious
or simple answers.
Discounting "hopeless" alternatives like departmentalism and
appeal to reason, Black noted that our system settled on submission
to a tribunal." But what kind of tribunal would possess-or be seen
to possess-the institutional integrity that would elicit obedience
despite its location in government? Black argued that the tribunal
would need to be (1) a plural body;W (2) "independent from active
policy-making branches";6 1 (3) comprised of "specialists in tradition";
who were (4) trained and socialized in "sifting carefully and then
deciding firmly."62 In other words: the Supreme Court of the United
States.
But while many would say that the Court's primary function is to
exercise judicial review to prevent governmental overreaching by
invalidating federal and state acts that violate constitutional limits,63
54. BLACK, supra note 47, at 42.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 43.
57. Id. at 45.
58. Id. at 46-47.
59. Id. at 48.
60. Id. at 50.
61. Id. at 49.
62. Id.
63. Black's book does discuss this "checking function" at some length. See id. at 87-
155.
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Black argued that perhaps its most valuable role is when it upholds
acts. "[A] case can be made," he wrote, "for believing that the prime
and most necessary function of the Court has been that of validation,
not of invalidation."" Because of the aforementioned legitimacy
problems that attend claims of ultra vires action by government,
"some means of satisfying the people that it has taken all steps
humanly possible to stay within its powers" must be devised.5
Using the New Deal as a case study, Black argued that the Court
there performed a valuable function by placing its imprimatur of
constitutionality on the various measures undertaken to regulate the
economy and end the Depression.' The so-called "switch in time,"
he argued, was the "honest result of honest reconsideration," and the
Court's upholding many programs after 1937 "was one of the clearest
instances in our history of the difficulty of legitimation faced by a
government of limited powers," because of the vehement
constitutional objections made by the New Deal's opponents 7 "We
had no means, other than the Supreme Court," he concluded, "for
importing legitimacy to the New Deal.""
If Sebelius-specifically Chief Justice Roberts' opinion-was
intended to legitimate the Affordable Care Act and silence those who
questioned its constitutionality, it appears to have fallen short of that
goal. We think this is true because several of Black's preconditions
for a successful legitimating decision were lacking in the run-up to
Sebelius. In addition, aspects of Chief Justice Roberts' decision
seemed unconvincing, even unprincipled. Appearances were unaided
by a gusher of leaks that followed the decision suggesting Roberts
had changed his vote in a bid to save the Court from becoming a
target during the 2012 Presidential election.
First, Black stipulated that honest differences of opinion would
arise over the scope of the government's powers and the Court would
satisfy the losers that they had had their day in Court through an
honest judgment, honestly explained. That sort of goodwill was
lacking in the debate surrounding the Act-especially the mandate.
64. Id. at 52.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 56-60.
67. Id. at 63 (emphasis added); see id. at 64 (writing that "the Supreme Court,
without a single change in the law of its composition, or, indeed, in its actual manning,
placed the affirmative stamp of legitimacy on the New Deal, and on the whole new
conception of government in America") (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 65.
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Nearly from the beginning, proponents of the Act alleged that any
constitutional objections had to be simply a proxy for political
opposition to health care reform. 9  Having been outvoted and
outmaneuvered by the Democrats, in other words, Republican
opponents of the Act were seeking a second bite at the apple by
challenging the Act's constitutionality. As the litigation progressed,
some law professors piled on, alleging that no serious constitutional
arguments existed and that those who claimed otherwise were either
dim or partisan hacks.' Opponents of the Act often responded in
kind, alleging that no one who was for limited government could fail
to see the obvious unconstitutionality of the Administration's attempt
to regulate inactivity."
Moreover, as courts began to take opponents' legal claims
seriously, members of the academy began battlefield preparation in
anticipation that the Court would ultimately decide the Act's fate.
This preparation alternated between flattering members of the
Court-op-ed writers were sure that the Court would do its duty and
uphold the obviously constitutional Act"-and preemptive claims
that any decision invalidating the Act would be an act of sheer
political will by a conservative majority run amok." Yale professor
Akhil Amar, for example, was quoted lamenting that his entire
teaching career will have been a fraud were the Court to invalidate
69. See, e.g., Neal Devins, Why Congress Did Not Think About the Constitution When
Enacting the Affordable Care Act, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 261, 276 (2012)
("Furthermore, to the extent that minority lawmakers invoke the Constitution, they do so
to derail legislative initiatives that they oppose on policy grounds. These very same
lawmakers conveniently ignore the Constitution when their party is in the majority.")
(footnote omitted).
70. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers: The Obvious
Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2012).
71. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual
Health Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581 (2010).
72. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, On Health Care, Justice Will Prevail, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8, 2011, at A27 ("There is every reason to believe that a strong, nonpartisan majority
of justices will do their constitutional duty, set aside how they might have voted had they
been members of Congress and treat this constitutional challenge for what it is-a political
objection in legal garb.").
73. See, e.g., Kevin Drum, What It Will Mean If the Supreme Court Strikes Down
Obamacare, MOTHER JONES, (June 18, 2012, 9:34 AM), http://www.motherjones.com
/kevin-drum/2012/06/clock-ticks-down-whether-weve-entered-new-era-american-politics
("It would mean that the Supreme Court had officially entered an era where they were
frankly willing to overturn liberal legislation just because they don't like it.").
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the mandate.74 In such an atmosphere, neither side was likely to be
persuaded of the legitimacy of any decision.
Black further described the ideal legitimating forum as one
whose members were schooled in "tradition" and capable of "sifting
carefully and deciding firmly." Though he didn't say so explicitly, it
seems that he assumed the justices would render principled decisions.
As his colleague Alexander Bickel would write, "judicial review
brings principle to bear on the operations of government."" This
form of decision-making was regarded by both as distinct from
legislative decision-making, in which deals are struck, logs are rolled,
and votes are traded. Black regarded it as essential that the
legitimating forum be "independent" of those branches. Bickel
thought that the "separation of the legislative and judicial functions"
was "beneficial" because "courts have certain capacities for dealing
with matters of principle that legislatures and executives do not
possess. Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and
the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing the ends of
government.",6  Courts' "insulation and the marvelous mystery of
time," he continued, "give[s] [them] the capacity to appeal to men's
better natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have been
forgotten in the moment's hue and cry.""
Chief Justice Roberts' opinion fails this test, precisely because it
gave the appearance of being a product of the "hue and cry." The
bulk of the opinion, of course, explains why the individual mandate
could not be upheld under the commerce power -a point on which
the joint dissenters agreed." But then it pivots, upholding the
mandate as a permissible exercise of the taxing power," which was
74. Ezra Klein, Of Course the Supreme Court Is Political, WASH. PosT, (June 21,
2012,12:42 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/wp/2012/06/21/of-course
-the-supreme-court-is-political/ (quoting Yale professor Akhil Amar saying that "[i]f they
decide this by 5-4, then yes, it's disheartening to me, because my life was a fraud. Here I
was, in my silly little office, thinking law mattered, and it really didn't.").
75. BICKEL, supra note 49, at 199.
76. Id. at 25-26.
77. Id. at 26.
78. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2585-93 (2012) (Roberts,
C.J.).
79. See id. at 2648 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting) ("[T]o say that
the failure to grow wheat or the refusal to make loans affects commerce, so that growing
and lending can be federally compelled, is to extend federal power to virtually
everything.").
80. Id. at 2598 (Roberts, C.J.) (concluding that the mandate "need not be read to do
more than impose a tax. That is sufficient to sustain it.").
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jarring for two reasons. First, because the opinion initially held that
the Anti-Injunction Act was inapplicable because the shared
responsibility payment was not a tax for Anti-Injunction Act
purposes." Second, because judges and academics roundly dismissed
this argument."
Congress, Roberts explained, can elevate form over substance
when it comes to its own statutes, but for constitutional purposes, the
Court decides whether something is actually a tax.8 And then
Roberts' efforts were still strained. Drawing on Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture Co.," the Chief Justice merely gestured towards three
criteria mentioned in that opinion without explaining why those
criteria controlled or were even especially relevant.85  Further,
Roberts' choice to uphold the mandate created questions about his
disquisition on the commerce power. Was it simply dicta? The Chief
Justice said not, but his reasons were not very convincing.' What
does it matter under which power the mandate seemed a more
comfortable fit? Once the Court has found one under which it fits,
what the Court might have to say about other powers that would not
authorize it is beside the point.
In addition, reliance on the taxing power courted additional
controversy by raising the question whether the mandate was a
"direct tax" that the Constitution requires to be apportioned by
population.' The term-whose precise meaning eluded the Framers
81. Id. at 2584 (Roberts, C.J.) ("The Affordable Care Act does not require that the
penalty for failing to comply with the individual mandate be treated as a tax for purposes
of the Anti-Injunction Act. The Anti-Injunction Act therefore does not apply to this suit,
and we may proceed to the merits.").
82. But see Brian Galle, Conditional Taxation and the Constitutionality of Health
Care Reform, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 407 (2010) (arguing that the mandate was a
constitutionally valid tax); see also Robert D. Cooter & Neil Siegel, Not the Power to
Destroy: An Effects Theory of the Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195 (2012) (describing a
theory upholding the mandate similar to that used in Sebelius).
83. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (Roberts, C.J.) (noting that while "penalty" label was
sufficient to avoid application of the Anti-Injunction Act, "it does not determine whether
the payment may be viewed as an exercise of Congress's taxing power").
84. 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (invalidating tax on profits of companies employing child
labor).
85. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2595 (Roberts, C.J.).
86. Id. at 2600 (Roberts, C.J.) ("[Tihe statute reads more naturally as a command to
buy insurance than as a tax, and I would uphold it as a command if the Constitution
allowed it. It is only because the Commerce Clause does not authorize such a command
that it is necessary to reach the taxing power question.").
87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 ("No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid,
unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.").
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themselves and continues to bedevil scholarse-and questions about
whether the mandate was a direct tax were again dismissed briefly
and, to some, unconvincingly" by the Chief Justice. In essence, he
wrote that while direct taxes applied to everyone just by existing,
some people are exempt from the payment of the mandate tax;
therefore, the mandate tax cannot be a "direct tax" for constitutional
purposes.'
The opinion's odd construction, and the curious refusal of the
dissenters to sign on to the Commerce Clause portion of the Chief
Justice's opinion, among other things," suggested some last minute,
behind-the-scenes maneuvering. On cue, the opinion's release was
immediately followed by a flood of stories that the Chief Justice had
changed his vote after initially siding with conservatives to strike it
down." Moreover, the story broken by Jan Crawford alleged Roberts
did so in response to the mounting pressure on the Court to uphold
the Act." The allegations outraged conservatives and contributed to
the debate over the meaning of the recent decline in the Court's
public approval ratings."
88. Compare Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
52-56 (1999), with Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of "Direct Taxes": Are
Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334 (1997); see also Erik M.
Jensen, Taxation and the Constitution: How to Read the Direct Tax Clauses, 15 J.L. & POL.
687 (1999).
89. See, e.g., Ilya Shapiro, We won everything but the case, SCOTUSBLOG, (June 29,
2012, 9:38 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/we-won-everything-but-the-case/.
90. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2598-99 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.).
91. For example, the joint dissent refers to Justice Ginsburg's opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part as the "dissent." See, e.g., Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2648-49
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (referring to "the dissent"). Of course
that might be explained by a sort of shorthand; Justice Scalia refers to Justice Ginsburg's
"dissent on the issue of the Mandate" in the context of the joint dissent's discussion of the
commerce power. Id. at 2648.
92. Jan Crawford, Roberts switched views to uphold health law, CBS NEWS (July 1,
2012, 1:29 PM) http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549/roberts-switched-views-
to-uphold-health-care-law/.
93. Id.
94. See, e.g., Ilya Shapiro, Chief Justice Roberts Sold Out the Constitution for Less
Than Wales, CATO AT LIBERTY, (July 2, 2012, 2:19 PM), http://www.cato-at-
liberty.org/chief-justice-roberts-sold-out-the-constitution-for-less-than-wales/.
95. See Adam Liptak & Allison Kopicki, Approval Rating for Justices Hits Just 44%
in New Poll, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2012, at Al (describing polling done prior to the health
care decision). Following the decision, and the revelations about possible vote changes,
public opinion fell further. See Brett LoGiurato, Poll: The Supreme Court's Approval





What those revelations won't do, any more than the opinion did,
is quell the debate over the Act's legitimacy. This is bad, because we
do need a mechanism for settling (at least temporarily) disputes over
the legitimacy and constitutionality of governmental action. As Black
realized, moreover, that mechanism needs to be seen at least as
nonpartisan, if not apolitical. At a minimum, a nonpartisan tribunal
should not be susceptible to partisan campaigns waged by the sides to
a controversy-this is one of the benefits a lack of accountability and
insulation is supposed to confer. Losers can at least leave thinking
they got a "fair shake." If, however, losers in constitutional cases
merely think they've lost a rigged game, they're either going to be less
likely to play, less likely to respect the outcome, or both.
It is possible that hashing these controversies out in the political
sphere instead of in the Supreme Court would be a desirable
outcome, but that possibility ignores the fact that the U.S. political
system has come to rely on judicial review"-and, to some extent,
judicial supremacy"to perform valuable settlement and legitimation
functions. Were the Supreme Court to lose its ability to settle
questions of constitutionality and legitimacy in the eyes of political
actors and the public generally, so that the answers to these
controversies had to await election outcomes, the stakes of those
elections would rise dramatically." Rule of law would then be
replaced by a more Hobbesian (electoral) might-makes-right regime.
Whatever the merits of such a system, it is not ours, and hasn't
been for quite a while. We have come to expect courts not only to
check, but also to confer legitimacy. To do that credibly, however,
courts-the Supreme Court in particular-need to be seen as
performing the judicial function in good faith. The run-up to (and
revelations following) Sebelius have made people wonder. The Court
simply cannot afford to have its integrity called into question
regularly and still retain the power to legitimate.
96. See infra notes 101-103 (discussing the views of James Bradley Thayer). See also
MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
97. See generally Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative
Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993) (describing how political
branches turn to courts to resolve issues when ruling coalitions are unable to do so).
98. See generally Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1359 (1997) (justifying judicial
supremacy on settlement function grounds).
99. See generally Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115
YALE L.J. 1346 (2006) (arguing that judicial review is anti-democratic and disputes over
rights should be hashed out by political branches).
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IV. Take Four: Thayer's Revenge
Nineteenth-century constitutional theorist James Bradley Thayer
is something of a hero to many conservative believers in "judicial
restraint."" It was Thayer's view that courts should strike down laws
on constitutional grounds only in cases of clear mistake'01 The first
defense of the Constitution, he believed, came from the conscience of
elected officials and the supervision of voters. Judicial intervention,
he feared, would cause those functions to atrophy:
The people of the States, when making new
constitutions, have long been adding more and more
prohibitions and restraints upon their legislatures.
The courts, meantime, in many places, enter into the
harvest thus provided for them with a light heart, and
too promptly and easily proceed to set aside legislative
acts. The legislatures are growing accustomed to this
distrust, and more and more readily incline to justify it,
and to shed the consideration of constitutional
restraints--certainly as concerning the exact extent of
these restrictions-turning that subjects over to the
courts; and, what is worse, they insensibly fall into a
habit of assuming that whatever they can
constitutional do they may do-as if honor and fair
dealing and common honesty were not relevant to
their inquiries.
The people, all this while, become careless as to whom
they send to the legislature; too often they cheerfully
vote for men whom they would not trust with an
important private affair, and when those unfit persons
are found to pass foolish and bad laws, and the courts
step in and disregard them, the people are glad that
these few wiser gentlemen on the bench are so ready
to protect them against their more immediate
representatives.... It should be remembered that the
exercise of it, even when unavoidable, is always
100. See generally Symposium, One Hundred Years of Judicial Review: The Thayer
Centennial Symposium, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. i (1993).
101. See James Bradley Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893) (articulating his rule of clear
mistake).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 40:4824
SEBELIUS FIVE TAKES
attended with a serious evil, namely, that the
correction of legislative mistakes comes from the
outside, and the people thus lose the political
experience, and the moral education and stimulus that
come from fighting the question out in the ordinary
way, and correcting their own errors.'o2
Thayer added that courts could, by focusing on exactly what
legislatures have done, "fix the spot where responsibility lies, and to
bring down on that precise locality, the thunderbolt of popular
condemnation."103
Set against Thayer's approach, this passage from Chief Justice
Roberts' opinion has considerable resonance:
Our permissive reading of these powers is explained in
part by a general reticence to invalidate the acts of the
Nation's elected leaders. "Proper respect for a
coordinate branch of the government" requires that
we strike down an Act of Congress only if "the lack of
constitutional authority to pass [the] act in question is
clearly demonstrated." Members of this Court are
vested with the authority to interpret the law; we
possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to
make policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted
to our Nation's elected leaders, who can be thrown out
of office if the people disagree with them. It is not our
job to protect the people from the consequences of their
political choices.'
Thayer's judicial minimalism was popular among conservative
critics of the Warren Court's expansive approach to judicial review;
set against a Supreme Court willing to enter into political thickets
that earlier courts had feared to part, it seemed appealingly humble.
There is no question that Thayer's fears that elected officials would
come to regard "constitutional" as synonymous with "whatever we
102. James Bradley Thayer, The Working of Our System of Constitutional Law, in
PHILIP KURLAND, JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND FELIX
FRANKFURTER ON JOHN MARSHALL 85-87 (1967).
103. Id. at 88.
104. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2579 (2012) (emphasis
added).
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can get away with" have largely come to pass. Roberts comes from a
generation of Federalist Society members who were heavily exposed
to such theories of judicial restraint, via thinkers such as Robert Bork
and Alexander Bickel.os It seems quite likely that the echo of Thayer
in his opinion was entirely conscious and intentional. In light of this,
how successful is Roberts' opinion as a Thayerian effort?
On the one hand, Roberts did bring the question of the
Affordable Care Act front-and-center in the presidential (and
congressional) election process, with numerous candidates taking
stands on repealing the Act (or not) almost as soon as the opinion
was announced." Thayer would have approved, presumably, of the
increased political awareness brought about after the decision-and
105. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 49, at 34-46 (discussing Thayer); ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990)
(espousing Thayer-like judicial minimalism). See also Richard A. Posner, The Rise and
Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV. 519 (2012) (describing Thayer's influence
and followers).
106. ObamaCare Repeal Bill Passes House, HUFFINGTON POST (July 11, 2012, 4:21
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/11/obamacare-repeal_n_1665772.html?utm
_hpref=elections-2012. And for a particularly Thayerite response, see James V. Smith,
Jr., Obamacare Repeal? It's Up To You, People, GREAT FALLS TRIBUNE, July 15, 2012,
http://www.greatfalistribune.com/article/20120715/OPINION/207150306/Obamacare-
repeal-s-up-you-people?odyssey=navlhead:
You are not helpless just because you only have one vote come
November.
Sure, that vote may not rock the Constitution in the same way that
Chief Justice John Roberts did, if he actually did switch his vote at the
11th hour from striking down Obamacare to upholding it, as the
pundits allege.
But in reading the majority decision, the Chief lectured you and me
about the importance of our vote when he said, "It is not our job to
protect the people from the consequences of their political choices."
You can read that to be neutral, as in: "Obamacare is not our fault, so
don't blame the Supreme Court." That's a tempting interpretation,
too. Because you have to go a long way to find anybody in
Washington, D.C., to take responsibility for anything. You could lose
an eye walking around the nation's Capitol with all the finger-pointing
going on every day.
But I'm gonna go with a different interpretation: "If you're going to
continue voting for these boneheaded politicians, stop whining about it
when they give you a boneheaded government with boneheaded laws
- it's your own danged fault."
Thayer would be pleased.
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even, perhaps, of some politicos' willingness to note that a statute
may be constitutional without also being a good idea.W
On the other hand, Roberts' Thayerism was rather partial.
Though his finding that the Act fell within Congress' power to tax
embodies a "Thayerish" degree of caution and humility, what of his
treatment of Congress' Commerce Power? The opinion's treatment
of the Commerce Clause, while in our eyes entirely reasonable, was
perhaps not absolutely compelled to the point that what Congress did
could be described as a "clear mistake"-at least not if the "mistake"
were to be determined by reference to the Court's post-New Deal
jurisprudence on the subject.
For Thayerism to achieve the desired effect of encouraging
responsibility by the political branches, those branches have to know
with a high degree of certainty that the Court will let them have
enough constitutional rope to hang themselves-and cannot be
depended upon to save them by intervening or taking the blame. But
does the opinion in Sebelius send that message?
And even if it does, what of the Court's other opinions? One
may approve or disapprove of, say, the Citizens United opinion,"' but
Thayerian it is not. A Supreme Court that follows Thayer's precepts
consistently might encourage political responsibility. But what about
a Court that follows Thayer's precepts capriciously? Such an
approach seems unlikely to foster either political accountability
among the political branches, or a higher degree of legitimacy for the
Court.
In what is perhaps an apt analogy, Thayerism may be compared
to a low-carbohydrate diet: if followed scrupulously, both may result
in improvements. But occasional bouts of restraint, alternating with
nonrestraint, are unlikely to produce improvement, whether one is
mixing judicial approaches, or piling bacon on top of doughnuts
because "it's low-carb." In either case, disciplined consistency is
required if the approach is to succeed.
Such consistency is difficult enough for individual dieters, as
America's ballooning waistlines demonstrate. But can a Supreme
Court composed of nine justices of differing approaches and
predilections, entirely independent of one another, achieve such
107. See, e.g., Robert Ehrlich, Jr., Obamacare: Constitutional, But Contemptible,
BALT. SUN, July 8, 2012, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-07-08/news/bs-ed-ehrlich-
obamacare-20120708_1_supreme-court-s-obamacare-tax-mandate.
108. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 50 (2010).
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discipline on a consistent basis?" Perhaps some court could, against
a background of shared social and professional values that
encouraged it to do so. But it seems unlikely that the present
Supreme Court, or likely any Supreme Court in the foreseeable
future, will do so.
One might argue, of course, that judicial capriciousness itself
might inspire responsibility elsewhere: with the Supreme Court not to
be counted on, because of its unpredictability, the political branches
might be forced to think things through. One might also argue-and,
in fact, one of us has so argued'-that unpredictable Supreme Court
decisions may have other constitutional virtues. Whatever the merits
of such arguments, they are not particularly Thayerian.
V. Take Five: The Umpire'" Strikes Back? Sebelius and the
Future of Judicially Enforced Federalism
To this point we have been quite critical of the Chief Justice's
opinion. In our final take on Sebelius, we consider the possibility that
Roberts is genuinely committed to the principle of limited
government and, moreover, is eager to see the Court play a role in
enforcing that principle. In this light, his opinion might appear to be
not the product of an opportunistic or risk-averse trimmer,12 but
rather a shrewd opening gambit by someone playing a long game.
When we last assayed the future prospects for a robust, judicially
enforced federalism following Gonzales v. Raich," we were not very
109. See Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 110 (1991)
(arguing Supreme Court behavior may be inherently unpredictable by doctrinal
scholarship).
110. Id. See also Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is Democracy Like Sex?, 48 VAND. L. REV.
1635 (1995) (arguing unpredictability in government can reduce special interest influence).
111. The reference is to Chief Justice Roberts' confirmation hearing analogy between
judging and umpiring. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination ofJohn G. Roberts, Jr. to
Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 56 (2005) (statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.). See also id. at 55 ("Judges are
like umpires. Umpires don't make the rules, they apply them."). The analogy did not
originate with Roberts. For an exploration of the analogy, see Aaron Zelinsky, Essay, The
Justice as Commissioner: Benching the Judge-Umpire Analogy, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 113
(2010).
112. See Cass R. Sunstein, Trimming, 122 HARV. L. REv. 1049, 1053 (2009) ("The
term comes from the seventeenth-century Trimmers, who tended to reject the extremes
and to borrow ideas from both sides in intense social controversies. Trimmers believed it
important to steer between the polar positions and to preserve what is deepest and most
sensible in competing positions.").
113. 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
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optimistic."4 In fact, we proposed the result in Raich, along with
backtracking by the Court in other areas,"' suggested the vaunted
federalism revolution of the Rehnquist Court was "zombie
federalism": a doctrine that "wandered aimlessly for a while, killing
off the occasional federal statute drafted with no thought as to
constitutionality (akin to the usual horror movie zombie victims who
wander away from the group), but which, in the end, was pretty easy
to kill . ... "' Specifically, we noted that, after Raich, it looked as if
"Lopez and Morrison, not Raich,... [were] the outliers."n. We also
noted that the Court had not exhibited "any appetite [for
strengthening] Dole's rather flaccid constraints on conditional
spending requirements . . . ."ns
Despite upholding the individual mandate as a "tax," Roberts'
opinion is notable for three things that suggest the Sebelius "nth
death of federalism" meme might be premature. First, seven justices
(including Justices Breyer and Kagan) imposed, for the first time, an
outer limit on conditional spending. While we suspect opinions might
differ substantially among the Justices as to what is "coercive" in the
future, that the line exists somewhere can no longer be denied."9
Second, whatever Sebelius' precedential value might be, five Justices
are clearly on record as opposing any attempt to use the Commerce
Clause to dragoon people into a national program. Activity, then, is a
precondition for regulation under the commerce power. Had it been
otherwise, it would be difficult-perhaps impossible-for a future
court to invalidate congressional action as exceeding Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause.
Finally, the Chief Justice's opinion rejected the Government's
argument that the Necessary and Proper Clause could support the
114. Reynolds & Denning, What Hath Raich Wrought?, supra note 2, at 927-32.
115. Id. at 928-32.
116. Id. at 932.
117. Id. at 931.
118. Id. at 928.
119. The "coercion" limit on conditional spending is what one of us elsewhere has
termed an "anti-evasion doctrine" that prevents officials from complying with
constitutional requirements in form, but subverting them in substance. They usually take
the form of standards that backstop rule-like decision rules. See generally Brannon P.
Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-Evasion Doctrines in Constitutional Law, 2012
UTAH L. REV. _ - (forthcoming 2013) (discussing the function of anti-evasion decision
rules framed as standards that make it difficult for officials to avoid rule-like decision
rules); see also Brannon P. Denning & Michael B. Kent, Jr., Anti-anti-evasion in
Constitutional Law, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. _, _ (forthcoming 2014) (discussing
significance of Court's creation of anti-evasion doctrine in NFIB).
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mandate. "Each of our prior cases upholding laws under the Clause,"
he wrote, "involved exercises of authority derivative of, and in service
to, a granted power. . . . The individual mandate, by contrast, vests
Congress with the extraordinary ability to create the necessary
predicate to the exercise of an enumerated power."120
[Sluch a conception of the Necessary and Proper
Clause would work a substantial expansion of federal
authority. No longer would Congress be limited to
regulating under the Commerce Clause those who by
some preexisting activity bring themselves within the
sphere of federal regulation. Instead, Congress could
reach beyond the natural limit of its authority and
draw within its regulatory scope those who otherwise
would be outside of it. Even if the individual mandate
is "necessary" to the Act's insurance reforms, such an
expansion of federal power is not a "proper" means for
making those reforms effective.12 1
This is a far cry from prior decisions whose scrutiny of congressional
claims of necessity was less than rigorous.22
But "what about the taxing power?" you might ask. This is
where we think the Chief Justice was at, perhaps, his most clever. His
120. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2592 (2012) (Roberts,
C.J.).
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. See, e.g., Sabri v. U.S., 541 U.S. 600,605 (2004):
Congress has authority under the Spending Clause to appropriate
federal moneys to promote the general welfare, Art. I, § 8, cl. 1, and it
has corresponding authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
Art. I, § 8, cl. 18, to see to it that taxpayer dollars appropriated under
that power are in fact spent for the general welfare, and not frittered
away in graft or on projects undermined when funds are siphoned off
or corrupt public officers are derelict about demanding value for
dollars. See generally McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L.Ed.
579 (1819) (establishing review for means-ends rationality under the
Necessary and Proper Clause).
See also U.S. v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) ("We have since made clear that, in
determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative
authority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the statute
constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally
enumerated power.").
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opinion left Congress with a great deal of power where it often has
the least room to maneuver: imposing taxes. Given the vehemence
with which the Administration initially rejected the characterization
of the mandate as a tax,'" it no doubt realized passing the Act would
likely have been impossible if opponents could claim the health
reform involved a massive tax increase. Roberts honored Congress'
"penalty" label to avoid application of the Anti-Injunction Act,"' but
held it was the Court that decided whether the penalty was a "tax" for
Article I, section 8 purposes.'" Thus, after Sebelius, the public,
legislators, presidents, and the media are on notice that simply
declaring that a particular provision is not a tax doesn't make it so.
This might make initiatives like the individual mandate difficult for
Congress to repeat in the future because opponents can credibly (and
correctly) characterize alleged "penalties" or "payments for choices"
as taxes.
The Supreme Court is a coequal branch of government.
Whether the issue is the trial of enemy combatants,126 the regulation
of violent video games,12 7 or the constitutionality of congressional
reform of one-seventh of our GDP, the Court does not like to be told
that it doesn't have a role to play. Chief Justice Roberts' opinion
(and that of the joint dissenters) suggests that judicially enforced
federalism has some life yet. For that, perhaps we have Nancy
Pelosi's incredulous response ("Are you serious?") to questions about
the Affordable Care Act's constitutionality to thank.
Conclusion
Our Five Takes are far from the only possible ones on a case as
important-and an opinion as disjointed-as Sebelius. The opinions
in this case, as in so much of the Supreme Court's modern work, may
inspire a degree of nostalgia for the confident clarity of the Marshall
Court, which-while sometimes wrong-was seldom unclear or in
doubt. (They may also inspire a degree of nostalgia for the
123. Jacqueline Klingebiel, Obama: Mandate is Not a Tax, ABC NEWS, (Sept. 20,
2009, 9:00 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/09/obama-mandate-is-not-a-
tax/.
124. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2583 (Roberts, C.J.) ("The AIA and the Affordable Care
Act... are creatures of Congress's own creation. How they relate to each other is up to
Congress, and the best evidence of Congress's intent is the statutory text.").
125. Id. at 2600 (Roberts, C.J.).
126. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
127. See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).
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comparative brevity of those early opinions, which somehow
managed to address issues of tremendous importance to the Republic
in far fewer pages than the modern Court.)
A cynic-or a law professor-might protest that these modern
characteristics are not bugs, but features, as they simply lay the
ground for extensive law review commentary, and, bug or feature,
that will certainly be the case with Sebelius. But as indicated above,
the Court's behavior here fits poorly with many theories of proper
judicial decision-making, from Thayer to Black to Bork. Perhaps one
final consequence of the Supreme Court's health care decision will be
a revival of interest in classic Legal Realism. If the test of a
constitutional theory is its ability to explain the Court's actual
behavior, then Legal Realism looks pretty good.
In that vein, we will venture one final observation: it is often
cynically observed that we don't really know the meaning of a
Supreme Court decision until the Supreme Court tells us, in another
decision. This is particularly likely to be the case here. Was the
Court's Commerce Clause and spending power language the
harbinger of greater restraints to come, or was it merely a
smokescreen designed to obscure the Court's failure to actually
restrain government action? A Legal Realist might say the answer
depends on who makes the next few appointments to the Court.
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